As part of a series of articles on the upcoming NCAA Men’s Lacrosse season, we are analyzing three schematic trends to watch for this season. In case you missed it, check out the rest of the series below.
Part One: Slow to slide defence
Part two focuses on the waning efficacy of the ten-man ride, one of the most important schematic tools of the last five years. Teams have won championships on the back of it, but the numbers and the eye test suggest it might not be the tool that it once was.
The question is, what is the next innovation of the ten-man ride?
TREND: THE NEXT EVOLUTION OF THE TEN-MAN RIDE IS COMING, BUT IT ISN’T HERE YET
The ten-man ride dominated NCAA lacrosse in recent years.
The concept of the ten-man is very simple: the riding team pulls their goalie out to cover a player, which frees up a defender in the middle of the field to aggressively double-team the ball. Good teams force the ball carrier into the corners of the midfield line and the sideline, which is where bad decisions happen.
Teams typically use the ride in situations where they have time to set it up, either on turnovers out of bounds or in situations where they can force the ball back to the goaltender. At minimum, the riding team needs to run a midfielder off the field to substitute another defender onto the field.
The rise was supported and perhaps driven by the back-to-back champion Virginia Cavaliers and Coach Lars Tiffany, who matched ideal personnel with the scheme and used it to devastating effect.
The below video by the Youtube Account Lacrosse Analytics does a great job of showing the ride that UVA used.
There are numerous reasons why teams run into trouble in the ride, but most involve some combination of rushed decision making, bad stickwork, and trying to beat double teams instead of shooting or turning back.
The ride affects the mathematical and emotional segments of the game. It twists the possession battle in the favor of the riding team, and turnovers often lead directly to easy goals. More importantly, the ride flusters, confuses, and bewilders opponents.
It’s a sneak attack that you know is coming, but can’t seem to stop it anyway.
However, coaches adjusted to the difficulties of the ten-man ride and found ways to combat it. For three main reasons, these rides have become less effective and less valuable.
REASON 1: JUICE ISN’T WORTH THE SQUEEZE
Statistics on riding are complicated, because they don’t separate between easy clears (for example after caused turnovers or clean saves) and they can be influenced by lopsided games against lesser opponents.
But on the whole, riding teams (measured in opposition clear rate) have had less and less success over the past four seasons.
Since 2019, opposing clear percentage has risen on a national level from 83.19%, to 86.19%. Below is a table of that evolution, which leaves out the abbreviated 2020 season.
| Season | National Average Clearing Percentage |
| 2019 | 83.19% |
| 2021 | 85.23% |
| 2022 | 85.34% |
| 2023 | 86.19% |
To use Virginia as an example, they held teams to a miniscule 71% clearing during their first championship season under Coach Tiffany. In 2021, they won the title again, this time holding teams to just 79% of clears.
In 2023, Virginia was dominant again, losing in the national semifinals in overtime. Their opposing clear percentage jumped to 85%. In other words, UVA was dominant in different ways, but the ten-man ride does not appear to be the weapon it once was.
In 2019, ten teams held opponents under 77% in the clear. In 2023, High Point led the nation at 77.9%. While difficult to measure who is using the ten-man ride and how often, the general trends show that the payoff of the ride might not be what it once was.
REASON 2: Shoot It!
Beating a ten-man ride can sometimes be complicated, but the best solution is often the most simple.
Shoot the dang ball.
A few years ago, some teams started dabbling with shooting the ball from their defensive zones. This led to some fun goals and it has become a legitimate zone breaking scheme.
While it used to be a last resort, coaches now teach players to look for the shot right away. Defenders practice these shots after practice and get reps during drills. Everyone on the team knows that if you get in trouble, shooting it is never a bad option.
As a surprise to nobody, defenders don’t need to be told twice to shoot the ball.
While Quin McMahon is a midfielder, this clip shows why the ten-man ride is getting harder and harder to run. Duke has McMahon (number 15) right where they should want him. They have a double team on the ball at the corner of the box and the midfield line. This is where they should be trying to double team the ball and create a turnover.
But instead of trying to beat the double team, McMahon clearly has permission from the staff to shoot it. He pulls up with confidence, and ropes a shot bardown.
Obviously not every one of these shots is as accurate as McMahaon’s, but he shows the confidence that players have in letting it fly. Also if you watch behind the net, teammate Pat Kavanaugh is rushing to the end-line to ensure possession.
This underscores one of the main components that makes the shot so lethal, it is a win-win for the clearing team.
If the shots do miss, they are almost always backed up. One of the main teaching points for a lot of ten-man rides is for the riding team to play “above” their marks. This means that riding defensemen often try to play ten yards or so closer to the midline than their attackmen. This shrinks the soft spot between the midfielders and defenders and allows them to aggressively play passes.
When the clearing team shoots it, this makes it very hard for defenders to try and win the race to the end line. If defenders start playing closer to the end line, the soft spots for clearing passes grow larger.
In short, full field shots are no longer comfortable to give up. They have an increasing rate of success, they have limited downside (due to likelihood of offence winning the runout), and when they do go in… they turn momentum.
REASON 3: PRACTICE TIME
While I hope to use data and video throughout my articles, this point is anecdotal. NCAA lacrosse teams spend a TON of time practicing against ten-man rides. This is especially true when preparing for a team that uses the ride a lot.
The below table confirms my findings. The data is from my own personal experience.
| Era Of Lacrosse | Time Spent Practicing Against 10-Man |
| Prior to Everyone Running Ten-Man | Something less than A TON |
| After Everyone Started Running Ten-Man | A TON |
Looking back to the introduction of the article, the main reasons for failed clears were bad stickwork, rushed decisions, and trying to split double teams. Years of practicing against the ride have helped to mitigate all three.
This time cements the game plan that a team has against the ride. Players know if the ride comes, their teammates will get to certain spots, and the plan takes place. This helps to avoid rushed decisions and establish order.
Secondly, the practice time helps to develop the most important skills that defenders need to be effective in the clear. One example are long breakout passes to attackmen from the defending zone. Practice time improves the skill level of defenders and warps the risk level for riding teams.
Lastly and maybe most importantly, defenders get used to the chaos and pressure of the ride. Now, players see pressure all week, and you better believe that scout teams around the country take pressure in cranking up the heat against the starters. There is nothing like the game, but simulating the ride all the time helps to slow it down.
And if you really get flustered, you can shoot it anyways.
CONCLUSION: WHAT DO WE HAVE NOW?
The adjustment that a lot of teams make is a partial 10-man, which is sometimes referred to as a 9.5, or 95, or 950. Instead of having the goaltender guard someone, the goalie just stands 10-15 yards in front of the goal, close enough to catch any long shots. The other backline defenders play some sort of a triangle zone.
While effective at stopping the long ball, this strategy is less effective than the original ten-man at creating turnovers. Playing a zone on the backline makes it harder to account for attackmen.
This goal on Saturday by Virginia Freshmen McCabe Millon shows several key components of the ride. It shows that defenders (or in this case a goaltender) are much more comfortable making long passes, as goaltender Matthew Nunes made a 60 yard pass look easy. When Millon catches it, you can see Michigan goalie Hunter Taylor scramble back in the goal, indicating that he was playing some version of a 9.5 ride. He came out of his goal, but didn’t cover Millon fully.
Millon capitalizes on the chaos, takes it straight to the goal, and scores his fourth of the game.
While this might be a “safer” strategy, the limited effectiveness reduces the reward to try an aggressive ride. As you can see in the clip, the 9.5 can have similar risk without as high of a possibility of creating a turnover.
Unlike just a few years ago, it seems the best riding teams are dropping their defenders back, and effectively riding with their three attackmen.
This is a good example from the champions Notre Dame, who produce a turnover at the exact moment that Anish Shroff is explaining (correctly) that they don’t run a ten-man ride.
This is effective but conservative, so expect ambitious coaches to continue to innovate on the ride. History tells us that someone will crack the next code to create chaos and confuse opponents.
Who, and what, will that be?
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